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MUNICIPAL PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
OF NONRESIDENTS
It is a commonplace that America's largest cities face fiscal crises of
varying intensities. The reasons are not hard to find. In a period of
rapid inflation provision of even traditional city services would require
raising larger amounts of money each year. Our standard of living has
risen rapidly in the past decade and, J. K. Galbraith to the contrary not-
withstanding, Americans expect some improvement in public services to
accompany improving private consumption. But higher quality public
services cost more money. The sixties saw the emergence of a much better
organized municipal employees' labor movement than we had heretofore
experienced; the initial representation battles won, these groups invariably
fought for higher salaries and wages-and the strike has proven a partic-
ularly useful instrument in their hands. Finally, we came in the sixties
to makes some sort of public commitment to sharing our national product
more equitably, to helping our impoverished citizens to break out of the
cycle of dependency. Insofar as this commitment implies a services strat-
egy as opposed to pure income transfers,1 it involves spending more money
on those services which have traditionally been furnished largely by cities
or by cities and states in cooperation. To all of these demands for in-
creased current expenditures must be added the fact that the social capital
of many cities is antiquated and needs replacing-Boston has not built a
new school building for over thirty years.
Few economists and fewer local public officials believe the cities can
raise the needed funds themselves. They begin by trying to estimate gross
amounts of local expenditures. In 1965 the Council of State Governments
projected that state-local general expenditures would reach $108 billion by
1970. Such estimates are necessarily based on speculative assumptions
for example, that welfare costs would rise less rapidly from 1962 to 1970
than they had from 1957 to 1962.3 Because such estimates are speculative,
they have tended in the past to underestimate expenditure increases. And
indeed the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (herein-
after, -ACIR") reported that spending had reached $93.771 billion by
1966-67.4 George Break, in his book Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
in the United States, cites several projections of state-local tax revenue
elasticity with GNP increases. These various assumptions yield 1970 tax
1J. Wilson, Urban Probl ms in Perspective, in THE METROPoLrrAN ENIGmA 351 (Wilson
ed. 1968).
2 G. BREA. INTERGOVERNmENTAL FISCAL RIELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 15
(1965).
3 Id. at 13.
4 ADWvsoRy CoaNsSSIoN ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATiONS (ACIR), STATE AND
LocAL NANcEs: S GNIFICANT FEATuREs 1966-69 25, Table 9 (1968).
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revenues for states and localities of between $64 and $70 billion, leaving
a gross revenue gap of $30 to $56 billion.; Even if user-charge revenue
and federal grants-in-aid continued to grow at their 1952-62 rates, they
would fill the revenue gap only if it were in the $30 billion end of the
range projected." And events since 1965 suggest that Break may have un-
derestimated the revenue gap, especially in its local portion.
Various structural proposals for bailing out the cities have been made.
Many economists have long favored greater use of the personal income
tax by states, with consequent revenue increases available for city aid; in
several states suggestions have been made that the state assume particular
functions-e.g., Massachusetts now pays for welfare statewide and Gover-
nor Milliken has proposed that Michigan take over educational financing
from its localities. Proposals to share the revenue from the federal income
tax with states and localities, first suggested by Melvin Laird, have at-
tracted a great deal of support from economists and now from the Admin-
istration. Finally, proposals to reorganize metropolitan areas, so that some
functions may be performed and financed on an areawide basis, continue to
attract attention; Mayor White has proposed a limited form of such metro-
politanization for the Boston area.
From the point of view of political officials and concerned citizens in
the central cities, all of these proposals have a major defect: they leave
the determination of the city's fiscal fate largely in the hands of outsiders-
federal or state legislators or suburban politicians. State and federal aid
programs must run the yearly gamut of the appropriations process; despite
the fervor of some of the litigants, it seems unlikely that reapportionment
is going to improve the political position of the very large cities to the
point where they can control that process in their states. Most federal
revenue sharing proposals have suggested that the funds be channeled
through a trust fund so that they would not have to be appropriated every
year. This would make them somewhat less politically vulnerable, but
the allocation could still be changed by a determined Ways and Means
Committee. Metropolitanization requires in most states the initial concur-
rence of suburban voters and, depending upon how integrated the resulting
structure was, would probably require continual bargaining with either
suburban electorates or their elected representatives. Thus even if one or
several of these reform proposals were adopted, the central cities would
obtain more funds only at the cost of some of their autonomy.
Some may object that the value of municipal autonomy is not readily
apparent. At the very least, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated. To
a great extent, it rests upon the arguments advanced for state autonomy
and diversity by Mr. Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.7
5 BREAAK, supra note 2, at 20.
6Id. at 20-21.
7285 U.S. 262 (1931).
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By providing arenas in which different sorts of social priorities may be
adopted, municipal autonomy may provide the experience upon which to
base national policy priorities. Additionally, there is much to be said for
the proposition that local officials are in the best position to judge the
quality and quantity of local public needs. Finally, the sought autonomy is
only relative; the state and federal governments retain legal sovereignty
and the superior fiscal power which will enable them significantly to influ-
ence local behavior through incentive grants-in-aid.
In their quest for more revenue from their own sources, America's
large cities have increasingly turned to the municipal income tax. The
purpose of this paper is to examine the interpenetration of economic and
legal theory as they apply to this tax, especially that portion levied on the
income of commuters and other nonresidents. Attention will first be fo-
cused on the demography and economics of metropolitian areas. Then the
economic theory of taxation of the metropolis will be examined. A short
description of the actual use of the municipal income tax follows. Then
the major portion of the paper will deal with the law governing the use of
the tax, especially the theory of taxation which emerges from the case law.
I. The Economic Basis of Municipal Taxation
As of October, 1967, roughly 64 per cent of the American population
lived in the so-called Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's), 8
and the figure was expected to reach 68 per cent by 1975.2 The Bureau of
the Census definition of the SMSA requires that it contain at least one city
with a population not less than 50,000. In addition, it will generally in-
dude the surrounding county (towns and cities in New England) and
adjacent counties which are metropolitan in character (contain a certain
percentage of non-agricultural workers) and are "economically and socially
integrated with the county containing the central city."' 1 This definition
permits very considerable differences in size among SMSA's:
Population Number of SMSA's ll
Over 3,000,000 5
1,000,000 to 3,000,000 19
500,000 to 1,000,000 29
250,000 to 500,000 48
100,000 to 250,000 89
50,000 to 100,000 22
There is also very considerable variation among the states in the percentage
of their population living in SMSA's: ten states have over 75 per cent,
8 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVi3RNMENTAL RELATIONS, Metropolitan Fiscal Dis-
parities 27 (Washington, 1967).
9 d.
10 J. BOLLENS & H. Sc~mANDT, THE METROPOLIS 7 (1967).
11 Id. at 18.
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ten have less than 20 per cent. 2 This latter fact undoubtedly conditions
greatly the political stance of cities when they seek assistance from state
legislatures.
Correlated with the variations in size are variations in growth patterns
and in the concentration of "urban problems" in the central city of the
SMSA. In the largest SMSA's and in the older central cities of some of
the smaller areas, the central city population is growing much more slowly
than the area as a whole.'3 For example the central city population of the
five largest SMSA's grew only 1 per cent from 1950 to 1960, while the
outside central city area grew 71.3 per cent.'4 (These figures include popu-
lation added by annexation of new territory. The figures are even lower
when annexations are factored out.) The ACIR details the disparities in
social and economic indicators between central cities and outlying areas
at great length.
The increasing concentration of black people in the central cities of
the SMSA's is an often noted phenomenon. Associated with this con-
centration is a marked increase in the proportion of the city's population
under fifteen.' 5 The city also has more than its share of those over sixty
years of age.10 Family income is markedly higher in the outside central
city areas. The table below shows the ratio of the number of families with
incomes over $10,000 per 100 families under $3,000 as of the 1960 Census:
Size of Area Total Central City Outside Central City
3,000,000 183.0 126.7 311.5
1,000,000 to 3,000,000 160.5 97.3 238.9
500,000 to 1,000,000 95.6 73.8 129.3
250,000 to 500,000 82.8 78.6 87.4
100,000 to 250,000 70.3 73.1 66.6
Less than 100,000 67.0 76.3 44.0
Total 17  123.9 93.5 169.4
These factors combine to give the central city a disproportionate share of
the public assistance caseload. In 1966 New York City had 44 per cent
of New York State's population and 70 per cent of its public assistance
cases; for other cities the figures were Philadelphia, 17.8 and 32.8; Balti-
more, 26.8 and 66.4; St. Louis, 15.5 and 25.5; Richmond, 4.9 and 15.2.18
Educational attainment as measured by median number of years of school
completed is less in the central city.'9 A larger proportion of central city
12Id. at 16.
13 ADvsoRY CO milSSION ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATiONS, supra note 8 at 31.
14 Id. at 32.
15 Id. at 40.
16 id.
17 Id. at 42, Table 9.
18 Id. at 41, Table 8.
'OId. at 46.
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housing is unsound and central cities have higher unemployment rates.20
The ACIR concludes that "'the Nation's central cities are becoming in-
habited to an increasing extent by 'high cost' citizens."'" While the dis-
parities are greater within the metropolitan areas of the Northeast and
Midwest, the pattern is the same throughout the country.
These disparities in social and economic indicators have led to dispar-
ities in actual expenditure by local governments. On the one hand, "in
32 out of the 36 largest SMSA's, the outside central city educational ex-
penditures exceeded those of the central city, sometimes by more than $100
per capita."2 2 The per capita gap has grown from $19 in 1957 to $42 in
1964-65.23 ACIR concludes, "This is a perverse expenditure pattern if it
be true, as we believe it to be, that children from underprivileged families
require a greater educational outlay to compensate for the educational de-
ficiencies of their home environment." 24
On the other hand, outside central city areas spent only $132 per capita
for noneducational purposes in 1964-65, 75.9 per cent less than the central
cities ($232),25 primarily because of differences in welfare expenditures.
These disparities resulted in a significant differential in tax burden: cen-
tral city residents pay 7 per cent of their income to local governments in
taxes, while suburbanites pay only 5.4 per cent of their larger incomes.20
The currently existing disparities are the result of a migration process
through the cities which is nearly as old as the country itself. Raymond
Vernon describes this process in great detail; at all stages it has been built
upon the ability of the relatively well-to-do to live at some distance from
their places of employment and to exclude poorer people from their resi-
dential areas.27  The process was made technically feasible by the trolley
and later the automobile and inter-urban railroad. It was made legally
feasible by zoning laws and ordinances. (Coupled, of course, with market
pricing of choice residential sites.) In the earliest stages this migration was
merely from the center of the city toward the outskirts, but at some point
the migrants began to cross the city's legal borders in larger numbers.
Cities have occasionally grown by quantum leaps by annexing either large
tracts of surrounding unincorporated land or by swallowing up theretofore
"suburban" communities. (For example the formation of Greater New
York in the 1890's, the consolidation of Boston in 1914.)28 But as legis-
20 Id. at 47.
211d. at 55.
22 1d at 65.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 71.
261d. at 77-9.
27 R. VERNON, THE MYTH AND REAInyT OF OUR URBAN PROBLEMS 12, 14 Parsim (1966).
28 R. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR PoLmcs 77 (1959).
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latures have become freer with the municipal incorporation privilege, and
as suburbanites have become conscious of rising city tax rates, annexations
have become increasingly difficult. It is a significant factor in urban govern-
ment today only in the West and Southwest. The result of suburban
resistance has been that while the SMSA's may be "economically and so-
daily integrated" they are never united under one municipal government.29
Suburbanites were able to protect their independence during the fifties
and early sixties when they were the most underrepresented portion of
the population in state legislatures; 30 they are less likely to lose the battle
now that reapportionment is occurring.
Suburbanites are well aware that city tax rates are higher and that a
large proportion of city revenue goes for public assistance measures, while
suburban taxes are spent on good schools. In fact, these different taxing
and spending patterns, as well as the diversity in public finance among
suburbs, has been thought an advantage by some economists because it
increases the choices of public benefits open to persons deciding where to
locate in a given metropolitan area.3 Public spending decisions, and the
level of taxes they imply, must be fairly visible to make this sort of mecha-
nism work.
Political fragmentation permits fiscal fragmentation because local gov-
ernments rely so heavily on the real property tax for revenue. This tax is
peculiarly localized in theory and operation. The tax is said to operate in
rem-against the property itself-so that if the owner has no income, the
land can be sold to pay the taxes. The theoretical price for in rem opera-
tion is that the tax can only be levied by a government which has jurisdic-
tion of the res, not of the owner. Cities have occasionally been given
extraterritorial power to zone land near their borders, but almost never
power to tax outside their boundaries. Indeed it is doubtful whether, as
a matter of constitutional law, a city could be given such power. American
states cannot exercise extraterritorial power in rem against either real or
tangible personal property.32
The in rem operation of the property tax presents cities with a difficult
predicament because of the metropolitan growth patterns just described.
Their continuation has led commercial property to follow residential prop-
erty to the suburbs. Under the impetus of World War II expansion, heavy
industry moved away from the very center of the city; the incentive was
lower land values and the possibility of using new material-handling tech-
2 9 BoLL NS & ScHMANDT, supra note 10 at 7.
30 See IL DIxoN, JR., DEmOCRATC REPRESENTATION (1968).
31 Charles U Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, October, 1956; W. Thompson, A PREFACE To URBAN ECONOMICS 259, 263
(1965).
32 . Cooley, THE LAw OF TAXATION § 92, at 218 (4th ed. 1924).
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niques which required one-floor construction.33 As soon as the war ended,
retailing, wholesaling, and services followed, often crossing city boundaries
in the move34 In the suburbs the value of this new construction cannot be
reached by the central city's real property tax.35
In addition to the erosion of its base in the city, the property tax suffers
from other serious infirmities. Primary among these is its low elasticity
of revenue yield. Since the war the national wealth in land and structures
has been growing 1.38 times faster than gross national product, so the
principal base of the property tax, real estate, is expanding fast enough to
yield increased revenue.3 6 But as Break shows, the yield elasticity of the
property tax is estimated by the ACIR to be between 0.7 and 1.1, much
lower than the rate of growth of wealth in land. When the ACIR figures
are adjusted to represent constant effective tax rates, the prospects are even
dimmer. While the yield elasticity for 1957-63 was 1.8, the Council of
State Governments did not expect it to be higher than 1.2 for 1963-70.37
To keep the effective rate constant city officials must make one of two pain-
ful choices: raise the nominal rates or raise the assessments. Each of these
decisions is highly visible and usually unpopular, and therefore doubly
distasteful to politicians. As pointed out above city councils must raise
rates or assessments just to keep up with inflation, yet each of these in-
creases incurs the same public disapproval as increases for new programs
or improved services.
Other factors inhibit the use of the property tax to finance increased
local expenditures. Most states impose limitations on property tax rates
so that cities could not raise rates very much even if their electorates were
predisposed to do so. Furthermore, cities compete with one another for
large taxpayers. Property taxes are probably not a very important con-
sideration in the relocation decisions of most businesses but city interest
groups which benefit from low rates may be counted upon to argue that
taxes are everything in industrial planning. The argument apparently gains
weight through repetition; the electorate is brought to believe that low
rates help it compete for business.
Even if the property tax could be expanded quickly enough and widely
enough, it is undesirable for localities to place so much reliance upon this
particular public finance instrument.
In the first place, the residential property tax is highly regressive at
lower levels of the income distribution: the poor are likely to pay a much
higher proportion of their income for property tax than any other segment
3 3 Vernon, supra note 27.
34 John F. Kain, The Distribution and Movement of jobs and Industry, in Wilson, supra
note 1.
3 5 ADVIsORY CoMMISsIoN ON INTERGOVENMmENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 82.
3 6 NETzER, THE ECONOMUCS OF THE PROPmRTY TAX 184-90 (1966).
3 7 BREAx, supra note 2, Tables 1-13 & 1-15.
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of the population, although the tax becomes progressive in the highest in-
come groups."' The property tax is also less visible to the poor than to
the middle classes because the latter pay it directly in two or four large
installments while the former pay it indirectly as a portion of their rent.
This may lead to a distortion of assessment practices in which multiple
dwellings are assessed at a greater percentage of their market value than
single family dwellings, an obvious inequity if the residents bear the taxi
in both cases.39
Second, the property tax has a distorting effect on consumption of
housing in all income classes. The tax in most places is largely a tax on
housing consumption at much higher rates than apply, through the sales tax,
to the consumption of other goods. This effect is only partially offset in
income brackets over $10,000 by the deductibility of the property tax from
adjusted gross income for federal income tax purposes. It is not offset
at all for those people who use the standard deduction. And of course
apartment dwellers may not deduct the tax at all because it is not imposed
directly on them,40 although they bear most of its burden indirectly.41 It
is illogical to tax housing consumption so heavily when we are trying
nationally to increase the supply of low-income housing.
Third the property tax has a deterrent effect on central city urban re-
newal at least insofar as it involves commercial property. New buildings
are an obvious target for the assessor and commercial property in general
tends to be assessed at more nearly its market value than residential prop-
erty.42 But developers must pay taxes out of income and property taxes
do not decrease when income falls off. Unlike the individual or manu-
facturer making a location decision, the developer is making an initial in-
vestment decision. If he expects property taxes to rise while rental values
remain stable, he will hesitate before locking himself into an investment
with a steadily declining rate of return.
Fourth, the possibility of manipulating assessment/market value ratios
affords an opportunity for discrimination and political favoritism. Despite
legal requirements for uniform assessment, cities may display systematic
discrepancies from neighborhood to neighborhood in the ratio of assessed
value to market value.43  The applicaion of legal remedies may require
expensive research beyond the capacity of most taxpayer litigants.
38NE'zER, supra note 36, at 54.
39 Id. at 75-83.
40 INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 164.
41 NEzmt, supra note 36, at 36.
42 N_ RP, supra note 36, at 79.
43 Oliver Oldman & Henry Aaron, Assessment-Sales Ratios under the Boston Property Tax,
18 NA=ONAL TAX JouRNAL 36 (1965).
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II. The Economic Theory of Municipal Taxation
How then ought the metropolitan area support its governmental ac-
tivities? Given that political fragmentation is likely to continue, is some
fiscal integration of the SMSA's justified?
Public finance theory is concerned with the effect of government upon
two major economic problems-the problem of distribution, how wealth
and income should be distributed among the population; and the problem
of allocation of resources, how scarce resources should be allocated among
different producers of goods in order to maximize social utilities. In the
metropolitan context, these questions may be restated:
1. What effect, if any, should local governments try to have on the distri-
bution of income within the SMSA?
2. What fiscal arrangements will ensure the optimal production of public
goods for the metropolitan area as a whole, whether produced by the
suburbs, the city, the state, or the federal government?
Dealing with the first problem requires economists to construct a gen-
eral ethical justification for taxation. Taxes take wealth or income from
citizens compulsorily; once governments have collected the revenue, they
must make spending decisions which perforce affect the distribution of
wealth, even if in unintentional directions. Taxpayers in demanding
justifications for expenditure programs almost invariably advert to these
distributional effects and argue the merits of programs in terms of these
effects.
A general justification of taxation is obviously a matter of political phi-
losophy. One prominent position, which may be called the benefit the-
ory, holds that it is the receipt of benefits from a government which ethi-
cally obligates a citizen to contribute through taxes to its support. This
proposition is closely related to the contractual theory of the basis of the
state. Musgrave points out that the benefit justification was advanced by
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Bentham, men prominent for their
espousal of the notion that political obligation is based upon some sort
of contract between the individual and society.44
At its most rudimentary level, the benefit justification says nothing
about the amount of taxes which each person should pay; it merely erects
an obligation to pay some taxes upon the notion of reciprocity: the citizen
is obliged because he agreed to be obliged and because he takes advantage
of the protection of his interests afforded by forming a government with
his fellow countrymen.
But the benefit theorists argue on a second level by contending that the
amount of taxes which a citizen pays should be adjusted to the level of
benefits which he receives from the government. This is what John Stuart
44 M MusGAvE, TimI THEORY op PuBLIc FINANcE 63 (1959).
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Mill called the quid pro quo theory of taxation;45 it attempts to distribute
the costs of government according to the amount of government services
consumed by the taxpayer. Furthermore, it advances this theory as an
ethical proposition-this is said to be the most equitable distribution of the
burdens of government. The same theory is advanced as an economic
proposition because it is thought that it will lead to an efficient allocation
of resources by government; that justification for the benefit theory will
be considered below.
The major difficulty with the benefit theory as an ethical proposition
at this second level is that it assumes a proper distribution of wealth and
income in society absent the tax and that the government should not be
concerned with redistributing wealth or income, either directly through
transfer payments or through free public distribution of the services it pro-
duces. Since under this theory the citizen must pay the cost of the govern-
ment services he consumes, the government becomes just another producer
in the market and every citizen consumes only what he can afford to pay
for. This ethical view no longer has wide acceptability. Even those who
oppose direct transfer payments by and large support the provision of some
free public services like parks, police protection, and some minimum public
education. If these goods are to be consumed free by the poorest citizens,
they must be paid for by someone else who is not the primary beneficiary.
It is usually when it is presented at this second level of operation that
the benefit theory is contrasted with the so-called "ability-to-pay" theory.
As developed by Seligman, this theory is based on two branches, the privi-
lege branch and the sacrifice branch.46 It is said on the one hand that the
state provides privileges to the citizen which facilitate his acquisition of
income or wealth and that in general the amount of wealth he is able to
accumulate is directly related to the number and sort of privileges he en-
joys. He could, then, justifiably be taxed in proportion to these privileges,
which determine his ability to pay. On the other hand, the sacrifice
branch asks how the tax system may equalize the burdens that taxpayers
bear. Arguing from the supposed marginal utility of income, the theory
concludes that sacrificing a larger proportion of his income is less of a bur-
den for the wealthier, higher income, taxpayer. Both branches of the
theory rely, as Seligman points out,47 upon a more organic theory of the
state than the contract theory. Locke for example, regarded man as hav-
ing rights, most importantly the right to acquire wealth, in society entirely
apart from government, whereas the "ability-to-pay" theorists see (cor-
rectly, I think) how important government-created/protected rights are to
that acquisition.
Musgrave points out that the 'ability-to-pay" theory emphasizes the
45 Id. at 62.
46 E. SELGMAN, STUDIES IN PUBLIC FINANCE 187.
47 Id. at 185.
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compulsory nature of taxation 8 In fact, it more or less assumes that every-
one is a citizen of some state and that the payment of taxes is an inherent
part of being a citizen. Just as most organic theories of the state, it assumes
the existence of political obligation without arguing for it. But it is im-
portant to see that the benefit justification for taxing a citizen at all might
consistently be combined with the ability theory's determination of how
much one ought to pay. That is, one might argue that a person is bound
to make an equitable contribution to the support of a government once he
has chosen to submit himself to its jurisdiction and therefore to claim
at least minimally some of its protection, but recognize that that principle
does not of itself determine in what an equitable contribution consists.
The benefit justification, as I attempted to show above, is at its most ele-
mentary level based on the notion of consent; it does not lead inexorably
to the second level of the theory, the quid pro quo determination of the
amount of taxes. I have dwelt on this possible combination of the benefit
justification and the ability determination of amount because I think it
offers a rationale for the principles the courts have applied in balancing
the equities in this field and in sustaining the taxation of nonresidents, as
will be seen below.
If the receipt of benefits justifies the imposition of some tax, then
dearly the central city is justified in taxing the nonresident commuter if it
can legally do so. For the benefits the commuter receives are manifest.
The benefits from living in a large metropolitan area generally stem from
economies of scale in the production of various goods, either tangible gov-
ernmental products or associational values. Larger cities can offer a larger
variety of jobs, neighborhoods and churches; only a few cities are large
enough to support good symphony orchestras; only New York is large
enough to support four major political parties. Large aggregates of people
cannot live in the close proximity required for the production of these
goods without a great deal of government, because the aggregation of a
great many people creates collective costs which would not exist if the peo-
ple lived separately. For example, a million people on their own family
farms may deposit sewage in their own septic tanks, but a million people
living together must dispose of sewage so as not to create health hazards
for one another, and creating a system which will handle that disposal
requires organization. Furthermore, sewage disposal is a so-called public
good: the public health benefit of the system accrues to everyone regardless
of whether he contributes to the support of the system. Unless public
goods are supported by compulsory contributions, they tend to be under-
produced because it is not sufficiently in the interest of any one person to
purchase his "share," much less to organize the effort. Commuters benefit
directly from the municipal government because they consume public goods
4 8 MUsGRAvE, supra note 44, at 63.
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during their working days: sewage, city streets, city police and fire protec-
tion, to name the most obvious examples. To a large extent the city
government protects the environment in which it is possible for them to
associate with large numbers of other people, which is the reason why most
of them wish to live in a large metropolitan area.
Commuters also benefit indirectly by living in close proximity to central
cities. For example, central cities invariably contain the high crime areas
of SMSA's, and central city police prevent at least some of that crime from
spilling over into suburban areas.49 And central cities provide a basic edu-
cation for residents' children, persons who are likely to be employed by
suburban factory owners or managers.
As Break argues, a great many of central-city-produced benefits may
spill out of the city to citizens well beyond the suburban fringe. Urban
educated children may well migrate to other cities; even if they do not, it is
of value to the whole nation to have a minimally educated electorate. But
many of the benefits accrue more directly to the particular suburbs than to
the state or nation at large (e.g. crime in New York City is more likely to
spill over into Long Island than into Pasadena), and the suburbanites
might well pay as such for the differential benefits they enjoy.
This brings us to the second economic question raised above: what sorts
of fiscal arrangements will ensure optimal production of public goods for
the metropolitan area as a whole? The benefit theory is widely suggested
as a partial answer to this question. If government benefits are distributed
upon payment of a price, then the market mechanism can help set the level
of government production. Even if the payments are compulsory taxes,
rather than prices, if they are paid in proportion to benefits consumed, the
political mechanism will help to set the level of production. As Musgrave
points out, this use of the benefit theory provides a theoretical solution to
the allocation problem of public finance, the problem of deciding whether
resources are being best employed in a particular government program or
whether they should be used for another or returned to the private sector.5 0
Several practical difficulties arise with this theoretical solution, how-
ever. In the first place, some public goods are not consumed in measur-
able quantities, so the items cannot be priced. Secondly, as argued above,
some items of government service are intended to be consumed in part
without regard to one's ability to pay for them, e.g. public education. In
the third place, the theory assumes too much of the political system; it is
often not a very fine reflector of precise public wants in quantified terms.
Break argues that because benefit spill-outs occur, local voters are likely to
undersupport programs:
49 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSiON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, Chapter 2, Section on
Crime and the Inner City (1967).
50 MusGRA vE, supra note 44.
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Both [private and social benefits] of these become external whenever they
are enjoyed by persons outside of the government jurisdiction that
generated them. When this happens local voters, lacking any financial
contribution from outside beneficiaries, are likely to undersupport the
programs in question, thereby impairing economic performance by dis-
torting the allocation of resources. 51
In consequence of these difficulties, economists usually argue for using the
pricing mechanism only where the goods financed and consumed are
closely analogous to privately-produced goods and can be easily measured,
e.g., use of water or downtown parking space. Lacking any fine-tuned
economic mechanism for distributing the rest of the fiscal burden, they
fall back on the equitable notion of ability to pay.52 The political system
is then left to determine by its own means the most efficient level of pro-
duction.
The application of this theory in the metropolitan area is somewhat
complex. Many economists agree that more user charges should be ap-
plied to the consumption of city services by commuters-for example,
downtown on-street parking is woefully underpriced, especially if the
city wants to encourage the use of mass transit facilities. As for general
taxes there is the fact that commuters consume unmeasurable quantities
of general city services; there is also the fact that, on the average, commut-
ers are better able to pay taxes than central city residents. On the other
hand, the commuter is almost always supporting a separate suburban
school system and probably other government services as well. Various
balances of the equities have been worked out, as will be shown below in
discussing experience with the municipal income tax; but I believe it is
correct to say that, at least at present, there is no consensus as to which
particular splitting of the central city tax burden between residents and
nonresidents is equitable.
III. The Municipal Income Tax-Part of the Solution
A number of cities have found a partial solution to their fiscal problems
in the municipal income tax. In its typical form, the so-called Philadel-
phia type, the tax is a simplified version of the most common state per-
sonal income tax. That is, it taxes earned income of residents of the city
regardless of where they earn it and the earned income of nonresidents
which arises from sources in the city. (Cities also tax business income by
and large, but that topic is beyond the scope of this paper.) Experience
with the tax to date argues strongly that it can be for most cities a flexible
progressive revenue instrument with few of the defects of the property tax.
In the first place such a tax enables the city to reach most of the in-
51 BREAX, supra note 2, at 63-4.
5 2 See, J. Due, GoVERNMENT FINANcE 108 (3rd ed. 1963).
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come of commuters, those suburbanites who derive the most direct bene-
fits from services which the city provides. Although there has been a
substantial migration of business beyond the city line, central cities still
have far more than their share of metropolitan area employment. In
1963 the central cities of the forty largest SMSA's accounted for only 46
per cent of the population of those areas, but they retained 67 per cent of
the wholesaling jobs, 69 per cent of the service jobs, and 49 per cent of
the manufacturing jobsr 3  Earned income from wages and salaries repre-
sents the vast bulk of income reported for federal income tax, so the city
could tax almost all of the income of those suburbanites who work in the
city. Of course for some cities the percentage of in-city workers who com-
mute is much larger than the average-in Boston the figure is near 40 per
cent; for these cities the increase in tax base would be much more sub-
stantial.
Enforcement of the tax against nonresidents is no more difficult than
against residents. All of the estimated tax can be withheld at the source.
Furthermore, the courts have aided in the collection of the tax from resi-
dents who commute out from the city by sustaining a withholding require-
ment imposed on outside employers? 4 And in fact the tax has been quite
successful in garnering large increments of revenue from nonresidents in
those cities which have already adopted it. Nonresidents provide 15
per cent of Philadelphia's income tax revenue, 25 per cent of St. Louis's,
40 per cent of Lexington's, and 20 per cent of Dayton's.5 Mayor Lind-
say hopes to increase significantly the revenue under the New York City
income tax by increasing the rates on commuters and simplifying the pro-
cedure. "
The income tax should provide revenues that expand faster than the
increase in GNP and much faster than the increase in property tax rev-
enue without the political embarassment of raising rates. The ACIR has
estimated its GNP yield elasticity at between 1.5 and 1.8, the lowest esti-
mate being considerably higher than the best estimate for the property
taxY7
It is unlikely that the enactment of the tax will lead to increased mi-
gration of residents out of the city. Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan's study
of the Economic Behavior of the Affluent for the Brookings Institution
tested the tax consciousness of a sample of persons with 1960 incomes of
53 Kain, supra note 34, at 27.
r1 See Dole v. Philadelphia 337 Pa. 375, 11 A.2d 163 (1940).
G Robert A. Sigafoos, THE M NIcPA. INCOmE TAX: ITS HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 79
(1955), Table XII. Recent data do not appear to be available. The Tax Foundation in its
1967 study noted the absence of such data, except from Cincinnati and Detroit. Cincinnati
collects 34 to 38% of its income tax revenue from nonresidents; for Detroit, the figure has
ranged between 29 and 18%. City Income Taxes, 38 TAX FOUNDATION, INC. (1967).
56 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1970, at 1.
5 BREAK, supra note 2, at 18.
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
$10,000 or more. More than 22 per cent of those questioned did not even
know their marginal tax rate for federal income tax purposes. Specifically
questioned about state and local taxes, only half believed taxes were higher
where they lived than in other places where they might conceivably live,
only one sixth of that half had even thought of moving on account of
taxes, and only one sixth of that sixth said they probably were going to
move on account of taxes.5" It is submitted that far fewer people among
the less affluent would consider moving for tax reasons.
Economists' concern about the possible effects of widespread enact-
ment of the tax has centered on the possibility that corporations will be
subject to multiple taxation in all of the cities in which they might desire
to locate and that this will distort their locational choices.5 9 While the
corporate municipal tax is not within the scope of this paper, it should be
noted that if cities have a uniform income allocation formula (and they
are required by federal constitutional law to make some allocation), the
tax will not affect locational choices. Furthermore, as argued above, the
property tax is probably a much greater problem for businesses consider-
ing relocating in the city or expanding there.
Insofar as the property tax currently constitutes a disincentive for re-
maining in the central city, adoption of the income tax would permit
cities to give some property tax relief. Ohio cities, some of which have
had the tax for more than twenty years, have come to rely upon it for
larger and larger proportions of their total tax revenue; it produces more
than 59 per cent in Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo. Detroit gets over 30
per cent from the tax, Philadelphia gets 46.6 per cent, and Louisville and
Lexington both get over 50 per cent.6" With the exception of Detroit,
property taxes are considerably lower in income tax cities than in other
cities of comparable size, and the rate of increase in the property tax has
been less.61 With the pressure on the property tax somewhat relieved, the
city would be able to engineer incentives for new construction into the
property tax structure; without any such incentives, Columbus was one of
only three older cities in the country to increase manufacturing employ-
ment by more than 10 per cent from 1958 to 1963, and Cincinnati and
Louisville were two of only three central cities which did better than
their surrounding outside areas.6" Discussion of such incentives is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this paper.
58F. BARLoW, H. BRAZER, and J. MORGAN, EcONOMIc BEHAVIOR OF THE AFFLUENT
160, 169-70 (1966).
59 ADvISORY CoMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, State Constitutional and
Statutory Restrictions on Local Taxing Powers 12 (1962). ADvISORY COMmiSSiON ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 101-02.
60 ADvISORY COwMSSIoN ON INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 95-6.
6 1 TAx FOUNDATION, supra note 55, at 29-31. Cf. Sigafoos, supra, note 54 at 87.
62 ADvIsoRY COMMSSION ON INTGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. The Columbus figure
may be influenced by annexations, supra note 8, at 53.
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Costs of administration of the municipal income tax are moderate.
In Pennsylvania local taxing districts, including counties and school dis-
tricts as well as cities, the average cost of collection for all jurisdictions in
1961 was 4.4 per cent of revenue. The average cost for the smallest
jurisdictions was 6.0 per cent, gradually dropping to 3.9 per cent for the
largest units, suggesting scale economies. Administrative costs in about
the same range have been reported for Ohio. The research director of the
Ohio Municipal League has estimated that costs generally run between 2
and 5 per cent of collections.6 3
As the tax comes to be relied upon more and more, administrative costs
as a percentage of collections should decline because merely raising the
rate should not impose additional costs. On the other hand, most munici-
palities have been very lax in attempting to enforce the statute against
evaders, particularly residents commuting out; they have been content to
rely on the efficiency of the withholding provisions to produce large
amounts of revenue without spending the additional funds to catch evad-
ers. "4 This causes obvious inequities, but no one seems to have estimated
the costs of greatly improved enforcement. Similarly, increased admin-
istrative costs must be considered closely when expansion of the tax to
unearned income is contemplated. Most large-city administrators thought
in 1955 that the costs would be prohibitive.6 5 Whether they have de-
creased by now would probably depend on whether cities could work out
cooperative arrangements with the Internal Revenue Service or state de-
partments of taxation. Mayor Lindsay was unable to get state collection
of the New York City tax because, apparently, Governor Rockefeller
feared people would think it was an additional state tax and blame him
for it politically.
The manifold advantages which the municipal income tax exhibits
have led to its increasingly widespread adoption in the last ten years.
The first city income tax was enacted by Philadelphia in 1939 under author-
ity granted to that city alone by the Sterling Act, passed by the Pennsyl-
vania legislature in 1932 when Philadelphia was near bankruptcy. In
1948 Pennsylvania passed the so-called "tax anything" act which permit-
ted local governments to tax any revenue source which was not preempted
by the state. Under the authority of that act, numerous Pennsylvania local
jurisdictions have enacted the tax. The city of Toledo, Ohio, acting un-
der its presumed home rule authority, enacted an income tax ordinance in
1946; Columbus, Dayton, Warren, Youngstown, and Springfield, Ohio,
followed within three years. St. Louis received a special enabling act in
1948 and put the tax in, but the only large cities to adopt the tax in the
03
.funicipal Income Taxes, The Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol.
XXVlII, No. 4, chapter on administration, 1968. Cf. Sigafoos, supra note 55, at 61.
(4 Id. at 57.
65 Id. at 67.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
fifties were Cincinnati and Pittsburgh, both following the lead of sister
cities. In the sixties, however, the proportion of large-city population
covered by the tax leaped from 14.6 per cent to over 40 per cent with
adoptions in Detroit (1962), Baltimore and New York (1966) and Cleve-
land (1967) .66 At the same time, the tax continues to spread among smal-
ler jurisdictions in Ohio and Pennsylvania, so that 86 per cent of the juris-
dictions imposing the tax are still located in those states.
The length of time which the tax has been in use has permitted the
development of a fairly extensive body of case law governing its use. It is
to that law that we now turn.
IV. Federal Constitutional Standards Governing the
Use of the Municipal Income Tax
It was argued above that two basic questions concern the public finance
theorist, the equity of the distribution of the tax burden (based on stan-
dards for the distribution of wealth in general), and the effect of taxes
upon the allocation of resources. It was demonstrated that it is fair for the
city to tax the commuter and necessary to do so if city services are not to be
underproduced. But the city's needs are not the only ones, nor are they
legally paramount. There are competing equitable and economic interests
which deserve recognition.
With regard to the equity question, there is the general ethical interest
that persons similarly situated be treated equally. This implies a presump-
tion against discrimination among persons unless a reasonable basis for
classifying them can be demonstrated. Hence on the face of things one
would question a city tax which levied a higher rate on commuters than
on residents. Similarly, a city might carry the benefit justification to an
inequitable extreme and try to tax persons who received only diffuse and
remote benefits from city services.
The competing economic interest is the ideal of free trade. Economists
since at least Adam Smith have argued for the elimination of trade bar-
riers between governmental jurisdictions. The advantages are twofold:
each location or area can concentrate on producing those goods in which
it enjoys a comparative advantage over other areas. Secondly, mobile
factors of production-capital and labor-can move freely to those loca-
tions where they are needed most.
The tax best designed not to affect locational decisions is a national
net income tax levied on profits after locational decisions have been made.
A uniform state net income tax would have virtually the same locational
effect. Barring that, a state system of user charges or benefit-measured
taxes would have little distorting effect.
Several constitutional clauses seem fit receptacles for these standards.
66 The history related in this paragraph is all taken from the Tax Foundation study.
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The privileges and immunities clause is directly targeted at preventing
discrimination by States against nonresidents (at least those nonresidents
who are citizens of other states). The equal protection clause is designed
to prevent states from classifying their own citizens for different treatment
upon arbitrary or unreasonable grounds.
The due process clause, in addition to its many other burdens, has
been interpreted as a general limitation upon the exercise of jurisdiction
by the States.6 7  The reason seems to be that the notion of sovereignty is
inextricably linked in American legal thought to territoriality. Cooley in,
THE LAW OF TAXATION 68 puts the matter this way: "The political juris-
diction of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, and therefore
it cannot lawfully impose taxes upon persons, natural or artificial, or prop-
erty, residing or situated beyond such limits." Judge Cooley (or his editor)
cites a number of cases holding that an attempt to tax beyond state bound-
aries is a taking of property without due process of law.69  The reason
for the rule, it is said, is the 'want of jurisdiction' or 'lack of legal interest
in the subject'-both of which phrases are conclusory and assume that
sovereignty is necessarily territorial. For these reasons Cooley criticizes
several cases permitting cities to tax land adjacent to them, even though
he admits that the cities may have conferred benefits on the land, because
the cities were not authorized to expend money so as to benefit that land.7"
When the courts rely upon the benefit justification for taxation, they sel-
dom make it as dear as Cooley does here that territoriality is a limit on
that justification.
The Supreme Court has often declared "that the commerce clause was
intended to secure free trade among the United States. 71 Insofar as free
trade is now our constitutional policy, states taxes must be judged accord-
ing to the amount of interference with free trade which they create. The
important result is not that income from interstate commerce go untaxed,
but that taxes not make it more expensive for a firm or individual to
operate interstate than intrastate.
On balance, it is the conclusion of this study that the courts have found
the equity and due process standards more manageable than the com-
merce clause standard. It is easy to understand why. Discrimination
against nonresidents often appears on the face of much state tax legisla-
tion which the Supreme Court has invalidated. And, the Court can judge
relatively simply when a state is attempting to tax a nonresident upon the
basis of some remote intangible benefit it has conferred.
But the free trade standard emerges from the commerce clause only by
67 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
68 Cooley, supra note 32 at 218.
691d. at 222.
70 Id. at 224.
71 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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negative implication.7 2  The taxing statute may display no evidence of an
attempt to favor local commerce and hence any adverse effect on interstate
commerce will have to be found by delicately weighing the tax's conse-
quences. Judges must do this balancing against the well known backdrop
of state fiscal difficulties. Finally, the adverse effect on interstate com-
merce may consist of the cumulative effect of a number of state taxes,
none of them unfair in itself. The remedy in such a case is not dear;
is the Court to strike down one or both taxes or is it to revise the rates
or credits as they apply to one particular company?
[Ilf the statute involved were not in itself unreasonable, to declare it in-
valid because of its contribution to multiple taxation would make the
constitutionality of one state's statute depend upon other states' taxes and
upon the taxpayer's decision as to which statute he wished to challenge.
To strike down all statutes contributing to multiple taxation, even though
none of them was unreasonable, would require extensive litigation and
would result in a complete exemption for those interstate businesses will-
ing to bring suit .... [It seems doubtful ... that a test based on actual
multiple taxation is workable .... 73
The approach of the Court in applying the commerce clause to these cases
is best summed up in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.7"
While it is true that a state may not erect a wall around its borders pre-
venting commerce an entry, it is axiomatic that the founders did not in-
tend to immunize such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs
of the state government in return for the benefits it derives from within
the State .... 75
In the same case the Court replied to the suggestions that such a tax might
result in multiple taxation by saying "none is shown to exist here."76 The
Court made no suggestion as to how it would or could handle a case
which did show multiple taxation (that is, taxation of more than 100 per
cent of the same base by a combination of states).
In addition, the Court has spelled out its reluctance, at least in recent
years, to interfere with state taxation which does not involve gross discrim-
ination. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wisconsin v. 1. C. Penney Co.:"7
At best, the responsibility for devising just and productive sources of reve-
nue challenges the wit of legislators. Nothing can be less helpful than
for courts to go beyond the extremely limited restrictions that the Consti-
tution places upon the states and to inject themselves in a merely nega-
tive way into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making.78
7275 HARV. L REV. 953, 1018-19, 956 (1961).
73 Developments, supra note 72, at 1018-19.
74358 U.S. 450.
75 Id. at 461.
76 Id.
77 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
781d. at 445.
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The Court announced the standards by which it would judge taxes
under the privileges and immunities clause in WY/ard v, Maryland.79  Mary-
land imposed a license requirement upon traders with a sliding scale fee of
$12 to $150 for residents and a flat $300 for nonresidents. Justice Clifford
began by reciting the sovereignty/territoriality basis of the taxing power:
Outside of the prohibitions, express and implied, contained in the Federal
Constitution, the power of the States to tax for the support of their own
governments is coextensive with the subjects within their unrestricted
sovereign power .... 80
This power dearly implies that nonresidents may be taxed:
Reasonable regulations for the collection of such taxes may be passed by
the States, whether the property taxed belongs to residents or nonresi-
dents; and, in the absence of any Congressional legislation upon the same
subject, no doubt is entertained that such regulations, if not in any way
discriminating against the citizens of other States, may be upheld as
valid;.. 81
But the particular tax in question was invalid because it clearly discrimi-
nated against nonresidents in violation of the purpose of the privileges and
immunities clause:
... the [privileges and immunities] dause plainly and unmistakably se-
cures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other
State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade,
or business without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take and
hold real estate; to maintain actions in the courts of the State; and to be
exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the State up-
on its own citizens.8
The principles of federal constitutional law by which municipal in-
come taxes are judged when applied to interstate commuters have been
laid down in cases dealing with state income tax laws. The cases are
dearly applicable to municipalities, for what a state cannot do itself, it
cannot permit its instrumentality to do.
The Oklahoma state income tax was the first to reach the Supreme
Court in the case of Shaffer v. Carter, State Auditor.83  Oklahoma im-
posed a tax very similar in incidence to most state and local income taxes
since enacted. The first section of it read:
Each and every person in this State, shall be liable to an annual tax upon
the entire net income of such person arising or accruing from all sources
during the preceding calendar year, and a like tax shall be levied, assessed
collected and paid annually upon the entire net income from all property
79 7U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
30 Id. at 428.
81 ld.
62 Id. at 430.
83 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
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owned, and of every business, trade or profession carried on in this state
by persons residing elsewhere.8s
Shaffer was a resident of Chicago and owned certain oil lands and leases
on oil lands in Oklahoma. Making the full range of constitutional argu-
ments, he contended that the tax as applied to nonresidents took property
without due process of law, denied the equal protection of the laws, bur-
dened interstate commerce, and "discriminates against non-residents in
favor of residents, and thus deprives plaintiff and other non-residents of
the privileges and immunities of citizens and residents of the State of
Oklahoma..." 85  The Court interpreted his argument as being that the
right to do business in a state as a nonresident was a privilege protected
from interference by the Federal Constitution, by one or all of the clauses
cited. The Court's reply, from the pen of Mr. Justice Pitney is worth con-
sidering at length because it summarizes the principles which have since
governed litigation in this area. As to Shaffer's argument, the Court said:
This radical contention is easily answered by reference to fundamental
principles. In our system of government the States have general dominion
[sovereignty?], and, saving as restricted by particular provisions of the
Federal Constitution, complete dominion over all persons, property, and
business transactions within their borders. . ..
The basic premise, then, is the sovereignty of the states, their continued
power to act as complete or supreme governments unless restrained by the
Constitution.
...they assume and perform the duty of preserving and protecting all
such persons, property, and business .. .8
Sovereignty is not just power; it implies certain obligations on the part of
the sovereign, the maintenance of the order in which commerce can take
place--to wit, governing.
... and, in consequence, have the power normally pertaining to govern-
ments to resort to all reasonable forms of taxation in order to defray the
governmental expensesS s
These statements may seem like perfectly straightforward political phi-
losophy, but they contain, I submit, two different premises justifying the
taxation. The state is a sovereign government with jurisdiction of all events
taking place within its borders; it has the powers pertaining to the concept
"government," including taxation. The other premise is that the state as-
sumes the duty of protecting commerce-i.e. it confers a benefit on certain
84 Id. at 44.
85 Id. at 46.
861d. at 50.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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persons-and "in consequence" has the power of taxation. The Court later
in the opinion speaks of "the state, from whose laws property and busi-
ness and industry derive the protection and security without which produc-
tion and gainful occupation would be impossible.. ." The first of these
premises reflects what Seligman called the organic theory of the state,89
the latter, the benefit justification based on the supposed contractual nature
of the state. These two premises, when extended to more difficult cases,
might yield different results if the Court saw them as different premises.
That is, if the power to tax really depended upon the conferring of bene-
fits, the Court might conceivably inquire whether in fact the state did con-
fer benefits in the particular case before it; the Court might even have come
to suggest that the tax be somehow proportioned to the benefits, employing
the second level of the benefit theory. For example, it might have insisted
that, at least in taxing nonresidents, the state employ benefit-oriented user
charges to the fullest extent practicable. On the other hand, the sover-
eignty principle, as suggested by the phrase "general dominion," suggests
a sort of omnipotence of the state within its borders and suggests that
the power of taxation is one of the many incidents of this power. In
contrast to the limits which the benefits premise might imply, the sover-
eignty premise is linked, as noted above, to the notion of territoriality.
One would expect taxation based upon sovereignty to be limited to those
persons with some sort of minimal geographical contact with the state.
Ordinarily deriving benefits from state government requires having
some minimal geographical contact with it. But as noted above from
Break, state and local governments may produce significant benefits which
"spill out" of the jurisdiction in which they are created. Carrying the
benefits principle to its extreme might permit taxation extraterritorially, at
least where significant benefits are conferred. On the other hand, sover-
eignty might permit taxation of someone passing through the state and de-
riving no benefits from the taxing government.
The Court has occasionally expressed the benefit rationale in language
which makes it seem that the presence of some benefit is a constitutional
sine qua non of taxation. For example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in State
of Wisconsin v. 1. C. Penney Co."
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarassed by the Con-
stitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its
power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which
it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an
orderly, civilized society.
[The sole constitutional test is] whether the taxing power exerted by the
state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given
89 Id. at 14.
00 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
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by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask a return.91
When litigants attempt to use this doctrine as a sword to attack state
taxes instead of as a shield for protecting, they are brought up short. In
Capitol Novelty Co. v. Evatt,92 the operator of a slot machine business
claimed he could not be taxed (personal property tax) because slot ma-
chines are illegal in Ohio and therefore receive no protection from the
state. The Ohio Supreme Court answered with a long quotation from
Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.93
A tax is not an assessment of benefits . . . [but] a means of distributing
the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which the tax-
payer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the
privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. See Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
US, [301 US 3081 Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes
except as they are used to compensate for the burden on those who pay
them ..... .This Court repudiated the suggestion, whenever made, that
the Constitution requires the benefits derived from the expenditure of
public moneys to be apportioned to the burdens of the taxpayer .... 94
The Court's approach seems to be to make the conferring of benefits
the justification for taxing, to presume that benefits have been conferred
(perhaps irrebuttably) when there is territorial jurisdiction, but to limit
the benefit justification to cases where territorial jurisdiction exists.
The Court does not deal with the fact that in taxing nonresidents for
the benefits conferred upon them, the state is taxing upon the basis of
rights which it is constitutionally bound to acknowledge. It may not ex-
clude commuters; it cannot condition their entry upon their ability to pay
taxes;95 but if they use their right and subject themselves to the territorial
jurisdiction, they can be required to pay.
In the Shaffer case, after setting out the premises just discussed, Mr.
Justice Pitney proceeds to consider the propriety of the income tax in par-
ticular. He notes McCulloch v. Maryland" for the proposition that states
have the "widest liberty" in the choice of taxes. Income taxes come within
this liberty:
Certainly they are not restricted to property taxation, nor to any particu-
lar form of excises. In well-ordered society, property has value chiefly
for what it is capable of producing, and the activities of mankind are de-
voted largely to making recurrent gains from the use and development of
property, from tillage, mining, manufacture. . . . That the State . . . is
91 Id. at 444.
92 145 Ohio St. 205, 61 N.E.2d 211 (1945).
93 301 U.S. 495 (1936).
94 Id. at 522.
9 5 Edwards v. California, 312 U.S. 160 (1941).
96 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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debarred from exacting a share of those gains in the form of income taxes
for the support of the government, is a proposition so wholly inconsistent
with fundamental principles as to be refuted by its mere statement. That
it may tax the land but not the crop ...the business but not the profit
derived from it, is wholly inadmissible.9 7
Pitney cites the value to the states of income taxes in particular: they
exact payment from those who have realized current gain and they are
readily proportioned to ability to pay.
Next the Court specifically addresses the privileges and immunities
point. It grants that a state may not deny to citizens of other states the
right to carry on a business within its borders, at least to the extent it
grants that right to its own citizens.
... but it does not follow that the business of nonresidents may not be
required to make a ratable contribution in taxes for the support of the
government. On the contrary, the very fact that a citizen of one State has
[such al right ... is a very reasonable ground for subjecting such non-
resident ... to a duty to pay taxes not more onerous in effect than those
imposed under like circumstances upon citizens of the latter state ...
It protects him against discriminatory taxation, but gives him no right to
be favored by discrimination or exemption. See Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall. 418, 430.9
Justice Pitney points out that the United States imposes a similar tax on the
income of nonresidents earned in this country, "'And, so far as the question
of jurisdiction is concerned, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes no greater restriction in this regard upon the several
States than the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes
upon the United States." 9  The fact that the income was produced at
least in part by Shaffer's personal effort, which might be thought to be
located in Chicago, was held immaterial, for Oklahoma's power over the
source of the income was said to be "in rem."'100 The Court also cited as
consistent with its decision prior opinions sustaining intangible personal
property taxation, in the debtor's state, of credits due a nonresident credi-
tor.'0
Shaffer also contended that there was a deprivation of privileges and
immunities in that residents of Oklahoma could deduct from gross income
all losses, wherever incurred, whereas nonresidents could only deduct losses
which occurred in Oklahoma. The Court also rejected this argument,
saying that the discrimination was only reasonable since Oklahoma could
only tax income from sources within the state. The Court states here
97 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 50 (1920).
981d. at 53.
1)Id. at 54. See, DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1919), sustaining federal taxation of
the income of a nonresident alien derived from securities held in this country.
300 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 55 (1920).
101 Id. at 52.
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what it implies elsewhere--Oklahoma cannot impose its taxes extrater-
ritorially.
The Court disposes of the argument that the tax burdens interstate
commerce without argument. Since the tax is on net income rather than
gross receipts, it is constitutional even if it includes income from inter-
state commerce, under the decision in U.S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek.02
Note that the Court makes no estimate of how much in fact this levy may
burden interstate commerce.
In the U. S. Glue Co. case the plaintiff questioned, on commerce clause
grounds, that portion of the Wisconsin net income tax which was applied
to its income from interstate sales. Justice Pitney for the Court distin-
guished between the direct burden on interstate commerce of a gross re-
ceipts tax and the "indirect and incidental" burden of an apportioned
net income tax. (The intricacies of state apportionment formulae for
corporate net income are beyond the scope of this paper.) A gross receipts
tax has a deterrent effect on commerce because it represents an additional
cost of doing business; a net income tax is imposed only if the business is
otherwise profitable-hence it does not deter interstate commerce:
Such a tax, when imposed upon net incomes from whatever source arising,
is but a method of distributing the cost of government, like a tax upon
property [actually it is less deterrent than a property taxJ, or upon fran-
chises treated like property; and if there be no discrimination against in-
terstate commerce, either in the admeasurement of the tax or in the means
adopted for enforcing it, it constitutes one of the ordinary and general
burdens of government, from which persons and corporations otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the States are not exempted by the Federal
Constitution because they happen to be engaged in commerce among the
States. 103
Note that the Court does not consider the possible deterrent effects of
cumulative net income taxes where, because of non-uniform definitions of
residence or apportionment formulae, the same net income is taxed "doubly,"
that is, at a greater rate than would be the case if the same volume of
business were done in one state. Instead, the Court imports a privileges
and immunities sort of test into the commerce clause: the tax is to be
upheld if it does not "discriminate" against interstate commerce.
On the same day as Shaffer v. Carter, the Court considered the provi-
sions of the New York state income tax as applied to nonresidents in the
case of Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.' Plaintiff was a New York
employer of residents of Connecticut and New Jersey. The tax was simi-
lar to that of Oklahoma with several additions:
1. It exempted from the taxable income of nonresidents annuities and
102 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
103 Id. at 329.
104 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
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interest on bank deposits and interest bearing obligations arising from
New York sources.
2. It limited all business deductions of nonresidents to those incurred
with respect to New York source income. (Shaffer discusses only a
loss deduction.)
3. Exemptions of $1,000 to an individual and $2,000 plus $200 per de-
pendent to a family were allowed only for residents.
4. Where a nonresident was the citizen of another state which imposed
an income tax on the income taxable under the New York law, the
nonresident was granted a credit on the New York tax equal to the
proportion of that tax which the nonresident's New York source in-
come bore to his whole income, if the other state granted a similar
credit to New Yorkers.
The plaintiff raised all of the constitutional questions which had been
raised in Shaffer, but abandoned the commerce clause argument on appeal.
(The equal protection argument does not seem to have been seriously
urged or considered in either case.) The Court considered the due process
question to be governed by Shaffer.10 5 It considered the privileges and
immunities argument as similarly governed.1 6 Indeed, the argument seems
much clearer when the deduction is of the New York type--exTenses in-
curred in the production of income ought to be deductible only with regard
to that income.
Yale & Towne's obligation to withhold the taxes was upheld as a rea-
sonable exercise of New York's power to regulate corporations doing bus-
iness within its borders.107
Having come this far, the Court invalidated the tax because it dis-
criminated between residents and nonresidents in the granting of exemp-
tions, a discrimination said to violate the privileges and immunities clause.'0 8
The basic purpose of the clause is to permit citizens of one state free in-
gress to and egress from other states and the right to pursue the same oc-
cupations as citizens of those states, and not to be subject to higher taxes
or excises than those to which the state subjects its own citizens. The Court
rightly noted that the exemption would result in a higher tax for nonresi-
dents. While "nonresident" is a broader term than "citizen," the language
of the clause, discrimination against nonresidents necessarily comprehends
discrimination against citizens of other states. The inequality is not acci-
dental or due to the peculiar individual circumstances of the particular
tax-payers, but operates generally on all citizens of other states who work in
New York, of whom, as the Court noted, there are many.
The discrimination was attempted to be justified by pointing to the
'O5 Id. at 75.
100 Id.
107Id. at 76.
108 Id. at 77-8.
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partial exemption of New York source income for nonresidents. The
Court found that this benefit was not at all proportioned to the exemption
discrimination and was in fact probably intended "to preserve the pre-
eminence of New York City as a financial center." 109
Finally, New York's attorney general argued that it was expected that
the adjoining states would soon enact income taxes of their own and would
grant particular exemptions to residents. The Court replied that that was
wholly speculative and that at any rate discrimination was not cured by
retaliation. 110 Justice McReynolds, who had dissented in Shaffer without
opinion, concurred in the result, again without opinion.
Following the Travis case, the New York statute was amended to per-
mit exemptions for nonresidents. It continued to allow nonbusiness "per-
sonal" deductions only to residents. This provision was challenged under
the privileges and immunities clause by a New Jersey resident and upheld
in Goodwin v. State Tax Commission."' The court held that the Travis
decision was still binding, but that it did not invalidate the deduction pro-
visions. It reasoned that deductions for personal expenditures amounted
to a limited subsidy of the particular activity by the state, and that a state
is permitted to give subsidies to encourage the welfare of its residents
without granting similar subsidies to nonresidents." 2 Furthermore it
argued that not every discrimination between residents and nonresidents
is unreasonable and so the test was "whether the factor of residence has a
legitimate connection with the allowance of these deductions, so that a
classification on the basis of residence is justifiable." 3 Thus the New York
court imports an equal protection clause standard into the interpretation of
the privileges and immunities clause. It concludes that there was a legiti-
mate connection in that personal expenses must be deemed (or might
reasonably in the exercise of legislative judgment be deemed) to be made
by a person in his state of residence, "the state in which his life is cen-
tered." It distinguishes the exemptions decided upon in Travis on the
ground that they amount to a flat reduction of the tax and hence were
constitutionally the same as imposing a higher rate on nonresidents, the
same analysis offered by Justice Pitney in Travis. It points out that the
deductions involved here are not flat amounts, that the taxpayers had
actually to expend the money, and that in lieu of the itemized deductions
the statute permits a flat 10 per cent standard deduction to residents
and nonresidents alike. The court does not deal with the problem which
would be raised if a person were considered a resident by more than one
state at a time, for example, if his life centered in each of them for six
109 Id. at 81.
11o Id. at 82.
1l 146 N.Y. S.2d 172 (1955).
112 Id. at 180.
11 Id. at 179.
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months of the year. If such a definition of residence is reasonable, then
such a person might be subject to double taxation or conversely, as in this
case, able to claim the deduction with equal justification for either place
and therefore legally for both places.
State decisions on the federal questions raised by municipal taxation
of nonresidents have followed Shaffer v. Carter rather closely as to the
basic benefit rationale of the taxation. But the state courts have been
more careful, at least in some instances, to point out the actual benefits
enjoyed by the particular taxpayer-litigant.
The first state case involving a city income tax was Kiker v. Philadel-
phia." 4 Plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey employed at the federal
Philadelphia Navy Yard on League Island. Exclusive jurisdiction of the
island had been ceded to the United States by Pennsylvania, but Congress
in 1940 permitted taxation of persons working in federal areas." 5 The
plaintiff contended that he was taxed on his salary from the Navy Yard
without due process because he received "no benefits or protection" from
the city. The court accepted his premise that benefits must be given or at
least that the taxing authority must be obligated to give them:
It is clear that in classifying persons for taxation an obligation on the
part of the taxing power to make available some benefit to them must
exist.16
But Philadelphia is obligated to confer benefits upon Navy Yard employees,
contrary to what plaintiff seems to have thought:
There is no doubt that after the cession, Philadelphia was obligated to
confer all the usual attributes of government-the same as those pos-
sessed by residents and citizens of Philadelphia-upon those deriving in-
come from working on League Island; fire and police protection, the right
to use all municipal facilities, etc. This obligation can be called into play
at any time the national government refuses or neglects to furnish them.llT
And in fact, the court noted, the city kept the Philadelphia River clear of
ice so that the plaintiff could use a ferry to get to work.
In Angell v. City of Toledo,"8 the Ohio Supreme Court made short
work of a due process claim by a nonresident of Toledo against that
city's income tax. Quoting the broad language of Justice Frankfurter in
Wisconsin v. 1. C. Penney Co.,' 9 the Court found a number of benefits
actually conferred upon the plaintiff:
114 346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289 (1943).
11G Sce 4 U.S.C. 14. This case required the Pennsylvania court to interpret the federal tax
statute to reach the decision that it was intended to permit the taxation of Kiker and others
similarly situated. Chief Justice Maxey dissented on this point.
11Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624,31 A.2d 289,294.
117 Id.
118 153 Ohio St 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
119 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
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The municipality certainly does afford protection against fire, theft, et
cetera, to the place of business of plaintiff's employer and the operation
thereof without which plaintiff's employer could not as readily run its
business and employ help. In other words, the city of Toledo does afford
to plaintiff not only a place to work but a place to work protected by the
municipal government of Toledo.120
The opinion is very unsatisfactory because the court does not say
whether plaintiff lived inside or outside of Ohio. If he lived outside of
Ohio, the court was merely deciding the simple federal question upon
which Shaffer is good authority. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff lived
inside of Ohio, the court might have been deciding to incorporate the fed-
eral territoriality/due process standard into state law (a state law question)
or it might have been deciding a novel federal point-that is, that the
federal due process clause forbids the states to permit municipalities to
tax extraterriorially. Without knowing where the plaintiff lived, it is im-
possible to tell which of these questions was being decided.
In Arnold v. Berra,'2' the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, raised the
federal due process/lack of benefits and commerce clause arguments. To
refute the due process claim, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted Kiker
and Angell as stating the controlling law.122
With regard to the commerce clause, plaintiff argued that Illinois and
its political subdivisions duplicated this tax by sales and franchise taxes
and also that he should be allowed to deduct the expenses of interstate
commuting. The court replied that state taxation of nonresidents had been
upheld in Atkinson v. State Tax Commission12 and that all the events
upon which the tax was occasioned occurred in Missouri. On balance it
seems that neither the court nor the plaintiff advanced the discussion very
much.
Finally, there is Dooley v. City of Detroit,'- also in 1963. The plaintiff
raised due process claims under both the Michigan and federal constitu-
tions, but it does not appear from the opinion whether the plaintiff was a
resident or nonresident of Michigan or of Detroit. The court relied on the
holding in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission,'125 that a state may tax the
extra-state activities of its own residents. As to nonresidents, the court
merely cited Shaffeer.12
12 0 Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179,91 N.E.2d 250,253 (1950).
121366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1963).
122 Id. at 323. Cf. Walters v. St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56,259 S.W.2d 377 (1953).
123 303 U.S. 20 (1937).
124 370 Mfich. 194, 121 N.W.2d 724 (1963).
125 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
126 370 Mich. 194, 121 N.W.2d 724,736 (1963).
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V. State Standards Governing the Use of the
Alunicipal Income Tax
A. Permissions and Prohibitions
In addition to meeting federal constitutional standards, municipalities
must find authorization for their income taxes in state law. The proposi-
tion that local government is the creature of the state and entitled to exer-
cise only so much authority as the state legislature has granted it is firmly
entrenched in state constitutional law. Not even the strongest advocate of
municipal autonomy the American Municipal Association, has suggested
that municipalities be in any way sovereign.'27 The implication of state
sovereignty is of course, the need to find some state authorization for the
exercise of local power.
Because taxation is such an important political issue at the state level
of politics, state legislatures have never given away their power to regulate
local taxation.
On the revenue side these demands [for autonomy in local financial af-
fairs] have been singularly unsuccessful, at least at the level of constitu-
tional theory. Although the precise rationale varies among the states,
the result appears virtually everywhere to be the same: both the type and
rate of local taxation are subject to legislative control.'28
State control is only somewhat muted by constitutional home rule, as will
appear below.
The municipal income tax is constitutionally forbidden in four states.
In Tennessee, Article XI, section 9 of the constitution forbids the general
assembly to authorize any municipality to levy an income tax.12  The
Florida constitution forbids the income tax to both state and local govern-
ments.130 In Virginia the constitution in one section says that tax sources
shall be split between the state and local governments; in a separate sec-
tion it authorizes the state to levy an income tax. The legislature has
interpreted this to mean that no local income tax may be levied, and has
passed a statute to that effect.' 31
In Colorado the constitution authorizes the legislature to impose a state
income tax.'32 In City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 33 the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted this section as pre-empting the income tax for
the state, in the absence of use of the power by the state legislature and in
127 Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw.
U.L REv. 27, 28-9 (1956).128 Michelman & Sandalow, Materials on Government in Urban Areas 422 (St. Paul 1970).
121 ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON IN'TERGOVBRNWENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 81.
130 Id.
131 Id.
1321d. at 82.
13Id.
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the absence of legislation forbidding local income taxes. The case is cor-
rectly criticized by Hartman, in his article on municipal income taxation. 3"
Absent any legislative history (and none is cited by the court), the con-
stitutional intent to preclude the city by authorizing the state is constructed
out of whole cloth. Hartman rightly comments that the purpose of an
authorization is to finance one government, not to deny another govern-
ment authority to finance itself.'5
No state constitutions explicitly authorize the tax.13
Explicit statutory prohibitions of local income taxes exist in Alaska,
Kansas, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia (as legislative interpre-
tation of the constitution), and Wisconsin. 3 7
Without relying upon specific constitutional provisions, local attempts
to levy taxes without explicit enabling legislation have been invalidated
upon the authority of Dillon's Rule.138  In Alaska the attorney general
denied municipalities the power to levy gasoline taxes. 39 A similar hold-
ing by the Oregon Supreme Court occurred in Eugene Theater Co. v.
Eugene.'40 These rulings would seem to encompass income as well as
other types of taxes.
In Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis,' the Missouri Supreme Courut
relied upon its own version of Dillon's Rule to invalidate the St. Louis
city income tax. The rule had been stated in Kansas City v. Frogge,'4
that no tax could be imposed by a city unless clearly authorized by the city
charter, the state constitution, or a general statute. 4 3  The city relied upon
a general authorization in its charter which permitted it to "assess, levy and
collect taxes for all general and special purposes on all subjects or objects
of taxation."' 44 The court replied that the city's interpretation of that
clause was inconsistent with the later specific grant in the same charter of
the power to levy license and some excise taxes. 45 Furthermore, such a
134 Hartman, Municipal Income Taxation, 31 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 123, 147 (1959).
1351d. at 147.
18 ADVISORY CoMMIssIoN ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONs, supra note 59, at 81.
'371 d. at 82.
138 "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied." Quoted in Michel-
man, supra note 128, at 252-53.
139 ADVISORY CoMMISsIoN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 81.
140 194 Ore. 603 (1952).
141 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 483 (1947).
142 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943).
143 356 Mo. 646,203 S.W.2d 438,443 (1947).
144 Id. at 444.
145 Id.
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broad interpretation of local power would be unprecedented and against
the presumption restricting local power-Dillon's Rule.14
Home rule powers of taxation have been liberally interpreted in only a
minority of states, notably Ohio, California, and Mfichigan. The Cali-
fornia constitutional provision in question empowers municipalities to
make and enforce "all laws and regulations in respect to municipal af-
fairs."'1 47 This clause was interpreted to include the power of taxation in
Franklin v. Peterson.14s Great use has been made of this power to enact
local sales taxes, but as yet there are no local income taxes in California;
San Francisco has considered the tax.149
The doctrinal context for the interpretation of the Ohio home rule
power was set in Zielonka v. Carrel.1 0 In 1912 as part of a constitutional
amendment program heavily influenced by the Progressive movement,
Ohio voters adopted Article XVIII, section 3:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws.
In Zielonka the Ohio Supreme Court applied this section to uphold an
occupational tax levied by Cincinnati. The court stated very realistically:
There can be no doubt that the grant of authority to exercise all powers
of local government includes the power of taxation, for without this
power local government in cities could not exist for a day.151
However, in paragraph 2 of the Syllabus the court noted that this power
was limited by the power of the General Assembly to interdict local
taxation or occupy a particular tax field itself.'
52
What had been dictum in Zielonka grew into full-fledged doctrine
over the next thirty years. In Cincinnati v. AT & T,153 the court held that
the General Assembly could occupy a tax field by pre-emptive implica-
tion,15 that is, without uttering a word. The new doctrine was applied
to invalidate a city excise tax in Haefner v. City of Youngstown. 5 In
1948 Glander and Dewey concluded from this development that in gen-
eral the legislature could authorize local taxes in a field it had itself en-
1-6Id. at 445.
147 Cohn, supra note 127, at 42.
148 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948).
149 TAX FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 55, at 39.
15099 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 139 (1919). See Glander & Dewey, Municipal Taxation:
A Study of the Pre-Emption Doctrine, 9 OHIO ST. LJ. 72, 75 (1948).
351 Id.
152 Id. at 76.
153 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.Y 806 (1925).
154 Glander, supra note 150 at 77.
155 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946). See Glander, supra note 150, at 75.
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tered by passing interpretative legislation. But the legislature was seen
by these authors as precluded from authorizing a local income tax; Article
XII, section 8 of the Constitution (enacted at the same time as the home
rule amendment, Article XVIII) authorized a state income tax with fifty
per cent of the proceeds required to be returned to the locality of origin.
Glander and Dewey felt (Glander has since changed his mind.) that this
latter provision would be illogical if it were not the constitutional intent
to pre-empt the income tax for state enactment. 156 (This is similar to the
argument of the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver v. Sweet, supra, p.
42.) To this author, the argument seems unsound. First, there is Hart-
man's reply-an authorization to one is not a denial to the other, r7 but
this reply is weaker here than in Sweet because of the fifty per cent sharing
provision. Second, the argument seems to imply a premise about splitting
revenue sources or types of taxes between states and localities, but there
is no legal reason for this doctrine in any state except Virginia, where the
constitution requires it. The only policy reason is to diversify the incidence
of the tax system as a whole; this can be accomplished as well within any
one level of government as among various levels.
The Ohio Supreme Court did not follow the Glander and Dewey argu-
ment. In Angell v. City of Toledo, 5" it held that the constitutional au-
thorization did not pre-empt the field and that cities were free to levy an
income tax, at least until the state did so itself. In so holding, it relied
directly on the home rule amendment:
A fundamental power of government is the power to raise revenue. At
the time of the adoption of Article XVIII, there was adopted, and re-
mains in effect, Section 13 thereof, which provides as follows: 'Laws may
be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts
for local purposes ... '
Section 6 of Article XIII of the Ohio Constitution [also] provides
for the restriction of the power of taxation by municipalities.'r 9
Under authority of the Angell case, Ohio cities have enacted income taxes
without any specific authorization by statute.
When Cohn wrote in 1956, he assumed the validity of an Opinion of
the Michigan Attorney General (Number 1409-1951) which denied
Michigan municipalities the power to levy an income tax, 60 based on the
Michigan version of Dillon's Rule. The Opinion went unchallenged un-
til the 1962 enactment of the Detroit income tax. But Detroit's tax was
upheld in Dooley v. City of Detroit.'6' The city relied upon a provision
156d. at 95. And see Glander, The Uniform Municipal iTcome Tax Act, 18 OHIo ST.
Uj. 489 (1957).
157 Hartman, supra note 134.
158 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
159 153 Ohio St. 179, 182,91 N.E.2d 250,252 (1950).
160 Cohn, supra note 127, at 35.
161 370 Mich. 194, 121 N.W. 2d 724 (1963).
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in the home-rule statute providing that "Each city may in its charter pro-
vide ... (1) for laying and collecting rent, tolls and excises .... -162 51
American Jurisprudence 24 (Taxation) was cited for the notion that
"excise" is a catch-all category, encompassing everything but poll and
property taxes. The court broadened municipal autonomy in taxation:
Consistent with the whole purpose of the home rule cities act and the
constitutional provisions pursuant to which it was enacted, the authority
granted was in broad general terms, each city being left free to determine
for itself what excises would best meet its local needs.' 63
Carter Carburetor and Denver v. Sweet were distinguished on the grounds
that the grants of home rule power in those cases limited taxing powers
to those granted specifically by the legislature. 6  Angell v. Toledo, supra,
was recognized as a parallel case.' 65
Cohn concludes that constitutional home rule as a political program
has failed to help solve the revenue problems of the cities because judges
have not been given dear enough standards upon which to interpret the
provisions.' 66 It seems to this author that the standards set out in Angell,
supra, are the proper ones. First, cities should not be barred from choosing
a superior fiscal instrument like the income tax; its fiscal virtues have
been outlined above. But second, because the tax is imposed upon non-
residents who have no vote in municipal elections, it is important that the
state legislature retain ultimate reviewing power over its operation.
B. Conditions Upon Use
State authorizations to cities, express or implied to use the income tax
are limited by additional doctrines and additional state policies. The most
important of these are described below.
1. The Uniformity Requirement
Most state constitutions contain a clause requiring that taxation be
uniform within the classes of subjects to which it is applied. The clauses
have been applied to hold a number of state graduated income taxes in-
valid, for example, in Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington,
and New Hampshire 67 An equal number of states have held the other
way, including Missouri, Georgia, Indiana, Arkansas, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, and Mississippi. 6 The original Philadelphia city income tax was
162 370 Mich. 194, 121 N.W.2d 724, 727 (1963).
163 Id. at 732.
164 Id. at 733.
100 Id.
166 Cohn, supra note 127, at 31.
16 7 J. Hellerstein, STATB AND LOCAL TAXATION 44-6 (3rd ed. 1969).
168Id.
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held to violate the Pennsylvania uniformity requirement in Butcher v. City
of Philadelphia.169 The cases are not examined in detail here because of
length. But it is this author's conclusion that the uniformity clauses are
not properly applied to invalidate graduated rates. These clauses were
primarily intended to prevent inequities in assessments of real property,
and they have been used successfully to attack grossly disparate assess-
ment/market value ratios. Income taxes are not property taxes-no assess-
ment is required. 'While an ethical case has often been made for progres-
sive income taxation,170 no such case has been made for the types of
inequities which grow up in assessments and which are not related at all
to the income of the owners. Of course, if courts persist in this doctrine,
cities will not be badly hurt: few levy graduated taxes, and those that do
are primarily motivated by equity rather than revenue considerations. Use
of graduated rates as applied to nonresidents raises no federal questions.' 1
2. Credits and Rate Limitations
Cities and state legislatures have dealt with the possible inequities
inherent in taxing the commuter to support two local governments by
granting credits against one city's tax for payments to the other. These
credit arrangements exist in several different patterns.
In Ohio credits are not required to be given by state law. See Thomp-
son v. City of Cincinnati;'" the Ohio Supreme Court refused to impose
the requirement because the Ohio General Assembly had refused to enact
a compulsory credit or deduction system when it enacted the so-called
Uniform Municipal Income Tax, Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 718.' In
consequence, Ohio city credits usually favor the city of employment: cen-
tral cities give credits to residents for taxes paid to outlying jurisdictions
where they work if the outlying jurisdictions grant the same credit recipro-
cally.
In addition, Ohio Revised Code 718.01 requires that the rate of taxa-
tion be uniform at one per cent unless there is approval of a different
rate by 55 per cent of the electorate at a general election or 60 per cent at
a special election.
Pennsylvania in its 1948 general enabling act gave priority to the city
of residence. That is, cities of employment are required to give a credit
for taxes paid to cities of residence. 7 4  Philadelphia is the exception-
cities of residence cannot tax income earned in Philadelphia. In addi-
169 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1939).
170 See, e.g., W. Blum & H. Kalven, Jr., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953).
171 Wheeler v. Vermont, 127 Vt. 361, 249 A.2d 887 (1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 4 (1969).
172 2 Ohio St. 2d 292,208 N.E.2d 747 (1965).
173 Hellerstein, supra note 167, at 613.
174 PA. ANN. STAT. tit. 52, § 6855.
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tion, no Pennsylvania school district may tax the income of nonresidents,
apparently on the theory that nonresidents get no benefits from the
schools. The priority of residence led a hundred small suburbs of Pitts-
burgh to enact the tax in "retaliation" for the Pittsburgh tax.'
Michigan has gone somewhat further than either Pennsylvania or Ohio
in broadening the base of its cities' income taxes. In its uniform act a one
per cent rate for residents and a one-half per cent rate for nonresidents is
provided. The city of residence is then required to give a credit for taxes
paid to the city of employment, so that in effect the tax is split half and
half by the two jurisdictions as long as they both levy it. Detroit is per-
mitted to tax at the rate of two per cent. 76
One basic problem with all of the credit schemes is that they work only
among taxes of the same type. Thus the central city may give a credit on
nonresidents' tax for residential income tax, but no such city gives a credit
for residential property taxes. Consequently the system discriminates be-
tween two commuters carrying equal residential tax burdens, depending
upon the type of tax used. This creates an incentive for suburbs to enact
income taxes. But because of economies of scale in administration, the tax
is rarely a very good revenue instrument for the small suburb.
It is suggested that if the state's goal is additional revenue for its large
cities that it permit only the large cities to levy the tax at all. This is the
situation in Missouri, where only St. Louis and Kansas City have authority
to tax incomes. If it is thought that this system overburdens some com-
muters, they can be given relief by way of state income tax deductions
(where state income taxes exist) instead of encouraging multiple retalia-
tory enactments of the tax.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
The municipal income tax is almost certainly here to stay. If the Ohio
experience is any indication, it may increasingly replace the property tax
as the mainstay of large-city government. We have seen its fiscal advan-
tages and the justifications for using it to tax commuters. We have examined
federal and state limitations on its use. The conclusion from the study of
doctrine is that a great deal of responsibility lies with state legislatures
for future development of the tax. Cities have originated the concept and
made it work, but only state legislatures contain representatives of all
the people being taxed. Courts have set the outer limits of the tax, but
lack the tools to make fine adjustments in balancing the interests of resi-
dents and nonresidents.
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